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Abstract 
In the current paper, we study the asymmetric normal-form game between two heterogeneous groups of  populations by 
employing the stochastic replicator dynamics driven by Lévy process. A new game equilibrium, i.e., the game 
equilibrium of  a stochastic differential cooperative game on time, is derived by introducing optimal-stopping technique 
into evolutionary game theory, which combines with the Pareto optimal standard leads us to the existence of  Pareto 
optimal endogenous matching. 
Keywords: Stochastic differential cooperative game on time; Endogenous matching; 
Fair matching; Pareto optimality; Adaptive learning. 
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1. Introduction 
                                                        
1 I am very grateful for helpful comments and suggestions from one anonymous referee. And I wish to thank the anonymous referee 
for the careful reading. Any remaining errors are, of course, my own responsibility. 
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Our purpose of  the paper is to supply a general framework for studying Pareto-optimal endogenous 
matching in any given normal-form game situations with two groups of  heterogeneous populations. 
Firstly, the existence of  the endogenous matching is confirmed. Secondly, the derived endogenous 
matching exhibits the following good properties: Pareto efficiency, individual rationality, and also 
fairness. Furthermore, random matching as an extreme case of  the endogenous matching under 
consideration yields economic-welfare intuitions and implications. Indeed, the present study provides 
conditions under which the well-known random matching is asymptotically Pareto efficient. And in this 
sense, we can further argue that this investigation has illustrated the existence of  Pareto-optimal 
social structure or social network in given game situations. In other words, it is confirmed that there 
exists a matching mechanism such that any given social structure can be led to the Pareto-optimal 
social structure. This hence deepens our understanding of  matching mechanism in game theory.2 
It is convincing to argue that people live in a highly structured3 society (see, Schelling, 1969, 1971; 
Bowles and Gintis, 1998; Pollicott and Weiss, 2001; Zhang, 2004; Pacheco et al., 2006; Pacheco et al., 
2008) consists of  groups rather than individuals, which implies that random matching will not always 
provide us with compelling approximation to reality when we are concerned with the interactions 
among the players. In fact, Ellison (1993) shows that local interaction4 will have very important and 
also different implications in equilibrium selection relative to that of  uniform interaction or random 
matching (e.g., Gilboa and Matsui, 1992). So, given the importance of  non-random matching in 
equilibrium selection, we express the motivation of  the present paper as follows, i.e., can we directly 
prove the existence of  certain non-random matching that is Pareto optimal and also endogenously 
determined in a given game situation? If  we can, what are the conditions we will rely on? In other 
words, the major goal of  the present exploration is not to study any exogenously given matching 
mechanism but to find out the optimal matching mechanism in a given game situation.5  
In two pioneering papers, Kandori et al. (1993) and Young (1993) prove that the trial-and-error 
learning processes of  the players will definitely converge to one particular pure-strategy Nash 
equilibrium, which is named as the long run equilibrium by Kandori et al. and the convention by 
Young. From the perspective of  multiple-equilibrium problem, they provide us with an equilibrium 
                                                        
2 Noting that Haag and Lagunoff  (2006) address the question of  the optimal spatial or neighborhood design when free-rider 
problems are localized, they indeed share the similar basic idea as the current paper. Nevertheless, there are two obvious differences 
between the both. Firstly, they focus on free-rider problems when social spillovers exist, that is, their problem is much more explicit 
than that of  the current study. And hence the present paper supplies us a much more general framework. Secondly, they employ graph 
theory and focus on specific spatial-structure while the current investigation uses evolutionary game theory and optimal stopping 
theory. All in all, our endogenous matching does (to some extent) include the considerations of  the above spatial structure. 
3 For example, it is induced or determined by the following factors: institutional segregation, market division, spatial structure, 
informational distribution, reputation, preference, emotion and motive, and so on. In particular, individuals usually have motives to 
sort themselves into matches with like agents, for example, better-qualified workers match with better jobs, more handsome men 
marry more beautiful women, that is, only “similar” agents match, as is emphasized by assortative-matching theory (see, Shimer and 
Smith, 2000; Atakan, 2006; Hoppe et al., 2009; Eeckhout and Kircher, 2010, and among others). 
4 These local interaction settings share the characteristic that each person interacts with only a subset of  the relevant population. One 
economic intuition of  this aspect is to capture in a simple abstract way a socioeconomic environment in which markets do not exist to 
mediate all of  agents’ choices (see, Bisin et al., 2006). As noticed and stated by Bisin et al. (2006), local interactions represent an 
important aspect of  several socioeconomic phenomena. 
5 That is to say, in an artificial world, we can employ the matching mechanism to lead the players to play the Pareto optimal Nash 
equilibrium regardless of  the enforcement cost. And in this sense, matching mechanism plays the role of  equilibrium selection device. 
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selection device, under which the players are correctly predicted to play a particular Nash equilibrium. 
However, we can also evaluate their contribution from the following viewpoint, i.e., provided a 
particular Nash equilibrium, they prove that there exists a pattern of  learning mechanism that will 
definitely lead the players to play the given Nash equilibrium. To summarize, they confirm the 
existence of  certain type of  learning mechanism, based upon which the players’ behavior will be 
uniquely predicted in the long run. Instead of  emphasizing micro-strategy, we focus on macro-structure 
and it is confirmed that there exists certain macro-structure or social network (e.g., Skyrms and 
Pemantle, 2000; Bala and Goyal, 2000; Galeotti et al., 2006, and among others) under which one 
particular Pareto optimal Nash equilibrium will be definitely played by the players. 
In the paper, we are encouraged to study the asymmetric normal-form games between two 
heterogeneous groups of  populations under the modified framework of  evolutionary game theory. 
Each of  the two groups is assumed to have countably many pure strategies. Hyper-rational 
assumptions (see, Aumann, 1976; Andreoni and Samuelson, 2006) about the players broadly used in 
classical non-cooperative game theory will be dropped in the present model, instead, the players or 
individuals play the game following certain adaptive learning processes arising from the stochastic 
replicator dynamics driven by Lévy processes (for the first time). On the contrary, the strategies 
themselves are supposed to be smart and rational enough to optimize their fitness, which directly 
depends on the stochastic replicator dynamics or the learning processes of  the players, following the 
classical as if methodology from the perspective of  posteriori. And the corresponding control 
variables of  these fitness-optimization problems are chosen to be stochastic stopping times or 
stopping rules, which reasonably reflects the fact that strategies themselves are no longer suitable for 
the roles of  control variables (as in the best-response correspondences of  Nash equilibria) because 
“strategies” of  the players’ strategies will not be well-defined through the traditional approach. 
Luckily, noting that the optimal stopping rules are partially determined and completely characterized 
by the learning processes of  the players, the optimal stopping rules as a vector may be exactly one of  
the Nash equilibra, no matter it is mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium or pure-strategy Nash 
equilibrium, of  the original normal-form games. 
Generally speaking, the optimal stopping rules as a vector will not be equal to anyone of  the 
Nash equilibria, that is, there exists certain difference between the both. However, it is confirmed 
that it is just the difference between the optimal stopping rules as a vector and the Pareto optimal 
Nash equilibrium of  the original normal-form game that established our Pareto optimal endogenous 
matching. We, hence, to the best of  our knowledge, enrich the matching rule widely used in 
evolutionary game theory by naturally adding into economic-welfare implications for the first time. 
Moreover, it is shown that the well-known random matching (e.g., Maynard Smith, 1982; 
Fudenberg and Levine, 1993; Ellison, 1994; Okuno-Fujiwara and Postlewaite, 1995; Weibull, 1995; 
Hofbauer and Sigmund, 2003; Benaïm and Weibull, 2003; Aliprantis et al., 2007; Duffie and Sun, 
2007; Takahashi, 2010; Podczeck and Puzzello, 2012, and among others) just represents one special 
and extreme case of  the current endogenous matching and we supply the conditions under which 
the random matching will be asymptotically Pareto efficient. Thus, proving the existence of  Pareto 
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optimal endogenous matching would be regarded as one innovation of  the present paper by noticing 
the above facts. 
In the next section, we will construct the formal model, introduce some basic concepts and 
prove the key theorem of  the present paper. There is a brief  concluding section. All proofs appear in 
the Appendix. 
2. Formulation 
2.1. Set-up and Assumptions 
Let 
1 2I I
A   be the payoff  matrix for row players and 1 2I IB   be the payoff  matrix for column players 
with 
1 2I I
A  , 1 2I IB   1 2I I , and 1I , 2I 1 . Here, and throughout the current paper, we study the 
replicator dynamics of  1 2I I  normal-form games between two groups of  populations. Put 
1 1
1 1
( ) ( )I i
i
M t M t  , where 1 ( )iM t  denotes the number of  strategy- 1i  players at period t . 
Similarly, let 2 2
2 1
( ) ( )I i
i
N t N t  , where 2 ( )iN t  denotes the number of  strategy- 2i  players at 
period t .  
We let 1 1( ) ( ) ( )i iX t M t M t , 2 2( ) ( ) ( )i iY t N t N t  denote the frequencies of  strategies 1i  
and 2i , respectively, with 1 11, 2,...,i I  and 2 21, 2,...,i I . Therefore, the average payoffs of  
strategy 1i  and strategy 2i  are given by  1, ( )u i Y t  1 ( )Tie AY t  and   22 , ( ) ( )T Tiu i X t e B X t , 
respectively, with the superscript “T ” denoting transpose, and  11( ) ( ),..., ( ),iX t X t X t 1..., ( ) TIX t , 
( )Y t   21( ),..., ( ),iY t Y t 2..., ( ) TIY t , and also 1 (0,...,1,...,0)Tie  , 2 (0,...,1,...,0)Tie  , where the 
1i -th entry and 2i -th entry are ones, respectively, for 1 11, 2,...,i I  and 2 21, 2,...,i I . 
Specifically, in the current paper, we employ the following endogenous matching mechanism by 
  5
incorporating two vectors, i.e.,  1 1 11,..., ,..., Ti I I       and 2 2 21( ,..., ,..., )i I IT          
with 1 1
1 1
0I i
i
   and 2 22 1 0I ii    , into the present model. Now, the generalized average payoffs 
of  strategies 1i  and 2i  are rewritten as  1, ( )u i Y t     1 1 1( ) ( )T T Ti i ie A Y t e AY t e A      and 
   
22
, ( ) ( )T Tiu i X t e B X t    2 2( )T T T Ti ie B X t e B   , respectively, for 1 11, 2,...,i I  and 
2 21, 2,...,i I . In other words,  1, ( )u i Y t    and  2 , ( )u i X t   can be seen as 1Tie A - 
perturbation and 
2
T T
ie B  -perturbation of   1, ( )u i Y t  and  2 , ( )u i X t , respectively. 
We now denote by  ( ) ( ), ,i iW W    ( )
0 ( )
i
i
W
t
t

  
 ( ), iW   the filtered probability space with 
( )iW    ( )
0 ( )
i
i
W
t
t

  
  the ( )iW   augmented filtration generated by d  dimensional 
standard Brownian motion  ( ),0 ( )i iW t t     with ( )iW   ( )( )iiW   ,   ( )iW   and 
( )i   a stopping time, to be endogenously determined. Moreover, we define 
  ,i iN dt dz     1 1,i iN dt dz  ,...,  , Ti in nN dt dz     
         1 1 1 1, ,..., , Ti i i i i i i in n n nN dt dz dz dt N dt dz dz dt             ,  
in which  
1
ni
l l
N

  
 are independent Poisson random measures with Lévy measures il

  coming 
from n  independent (one-dimensional) Lévy processes 1 ( )
i t   
0
1 1 10
,
t i i iz N ds dz     ,…, 
( )in t   
00
,
t i i i
n n nz N ds dz        with 0     0 , and then the corresponding stochastic basis is 
given by  ( ) ( ), ,i iN N     ( )
0 ( )
i
i
N
t
t

  
 ( ), iN   with ( )iN    ( )
0 ( )
i
i
N
t
t

  
  the ( )iN    
augmented filtration and ( )
iN   ( )
( )
i
i
N 
 
 ,   ( )iN    and ( )i   a stopping time, to be 
endogenously determined. Thus, we are provided with a new stochastic basis  , ,i i    
 
0 ( )i
i
t t

   , i , where i  ( )iW   ( )iN   , i  ( )iW   ( )iN  , it   ( )iWt   ( )iNt  , 
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i  ( )iW   ( )iN   and i   
0 ( )i
i
t t

    denotes the corresponding filtration satisfying the 
well-known “usual conditions”. Here, and throughout the current paper, i  is used to denote the 
expectation operator with respect to (w. r. t.) the probability law i  for  1, 2,...,i I   and 
for 1, 2  . Naturally, we have stochastic basis  , ,     
0 ( )t t 

   ,   with   I ii    , 
  I ii    , t   I ii t   ,   I ii    , ( )   ( )I ii      ( )I ii      if  1  , and 
( )   ( )I ii      ( )I ii       if  2   with    ,    0 ( )t t      denoting the 
corresponding filtration satisfying the usual conditions, and   is used to denote the expectation 
operator w. r. t. the probability law   for 1, 2  . Furthermore, we are led to the following 
probability space  , ,   0 ( ) ,t t      with 2 1     , 2 1    , 2 1t t    , 
2
1

   , 2 1( ) ( )     with  ,  0 ( )t t      denoting the corresponding 
filtration satisfying the usual conditions, and   is used to denote the expectation operator w. r. t. 
the probability law  . 
We now define the canonical Lebesgue measure   on measure space  ,  B  with 
   0, ,   (0, )  and  B  the Borel sigma-algebra, and also the corresponding 
regular properties about Lebesgue measure are supposed to be fulfilled. Thus, we can define the 
following product measure spaces  i    , i   B  and      ,    B  with 
corresponding product measures   i  and    , respectively, for  1,2,...,i I   and 
for 1,2  . 
Now, based upon the probability space  , ,i i   i , i  for 1,2  , and following 
Fudenberg and Harris (1992), Cabrales (2000), Imhof  (2005), Benaïm et al (2008), Hofbauer and 
Imhof  (2009), the stochastic replicator dynamics6 of  the two groups of  populations can be 
                                                        
6 Throughout, the stochastic replicator dynamics will help us to construct adaptive learning processes for the players following the 
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respectively given as follows, 
   1 11 1 1 1 1 11 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
0
1 11 1
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) , ,
d n
i i i i i iT
i i k k i l l l l
k l
dM t M t e AY t dt t dW t t z N dt dz 
 
        , 
   2 22 2 2 2 2 22 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
0
2 21 1
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) , ,
d n
i i i i i iT T
i i k k i l l l l
k l
dN t N t e B X t dt t dW t t z N dt dz 
 
         . 
where 1 ( )iM t  is assumed to be  1i   B adapted, 2 ( )iN t  is  2i   B adapted, ( )Y t  
is also assumed to be  2   B adapted, ( )X t  is  1   B adapted, 1 1 ( )i k t  and 
 11 1 1, ii l lt z  are  1i   B progressively measurable, and 2 2 ( )i k t  and  22 2 2, ii l lt z  are 2i   
B    progressively measurable, for  1 11, 2,...,i I ,  2 21, 2,...,i I ,  1 11, 2,...,k d ,   
2 21, 2,...,k d ,  1 11, 2,...,l n  and  2 21, 2,...,l n . 
ASSUMPTION 1: Throughout the current paper, both ( )M t  and ( )N t , sufficiently large, are assumed to 
be finite constants. 
Notice from Assumption 1 that the sizes of  the two populations are finite constants, based on 
Itô’s rule one can easily obtain, 
   1 11 1 1 1 1 11 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
0
1 11 1
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) , ,
d n
i i i i i iT
i i k k i l l l l
k l
dX t X t e AY t dt t dW t t z N dt dz 
 
         
   1 1 1 1 1 1 111
0
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) , ,n
i i i i i i iT
iX t e AY t dt t dW t t z N dt dz       , 
   2 22 2 2 2 2 22 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
0
2 21 1
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) , ,
d n
i i i i i iT T
i i k k i l l l l
k l
dY t Y t e B X t dt t dW t t z N dt dz 
 
               
   2 2 2 2 2 2 222
0
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) , ,n
i i i i i i iT T
iY t e B X t dt t dW t t z N dt dz        . 
subject to the initial conditions, i.e., 1 (0) (0,...,0)i TW   1i  a.s., 2 (0) (0,...,0)i TW   2i  a.s., 
(0)X   1 11(0),..., (0),..., (0) Ti IX X X   1 11,..., ,..., Ti Ix x x  0x  1  a.s., (0)Y   1(0),Y  
                                                                                                                                                                                   
argument of  Gale et al. (1995), Binmore et al. (1995), Börgers and Sarin (1997), Cabrales (2000), and Beggs (2002). Thus, we will take 
indifference between the stochastic replicator dynamics and the adaptive learning processes. 
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2 2..., (0),..., (0) Ti IY Y   2 21,..., ,..., Ti Iy y y  0y   2  a.s., 1 ( )iX t  is assumed to be 
 1i   B adapted, and 2 ( )iY t  is assumed to be  2i   B adapted, for  1i  11, 2,..., I  
and  2i  21, 2,..., I . Moreover, with a little abuse of  notations, we put 1 (0)i   11(0),i  
1 1 1 1..., (0),..., (0) Ti k i d    1 1 1 1 11,..., ,..., Ti i k i d    1i ,  1 10,i iz      1 11 1 1 11 10, ,..., 0, ,...,i ii i l lz z   
 11 1 10, Tii n nz        1 1 11 1 1 1 1 1 11 1 ,..., ,..., Ti i ii i l l i n nz z z     1 1i iz , 2 (0)i   2 2 21(0),..., (0),...,i i k    
2 2 (0) Ti d   2 2 2 2 21,..., ,..., Ti i k i d      2i , and  2 20,i iz      2 22 2 2 21 10, ,..., 0, ,...,i ii i l lz z    
 22 2 20, Tii n nz        2 2 22 2 2 2 2 2 21 1 ,..., ,..., Ti i ii i l l i n nz z z       2 2i iz , for  1i  11, 2,..., I  and  2i  
 21, 2,..., I . And also we set the following technical assumption, 
ASSUMPTION 2: The initial conditions 1 (0)iX  1ix 0 , 2 (0)iY  2iy 0 , (0)X  x 0  and 
(0)Y  y 0  are all supposed to be deterministic and bounded for  1i  11,2,..., I  and  2i  21,2,..., I . 
Furthermore, 1 0i   1i  a.s., 2 0i   2i  a.s.,  11 1 1, ii l lt z  111 il     1i  a.e., and 
 22 2 2, ii l lt z  221 il     2i  a.e., for  11il 0 , 22il 0  and for  1i  11,2,..., I ; 2i  21,2,..., I ; 
1l  11,2,...,n  and 2l  21,2,...,n . 
2.2. Stochastic Differential Cooperative Game on Time 
Now, as in the model of  Nowak et al (2004), and Imhof  and Nowak (2006), we define the following 
generalized expected discounted fitness functions, 
      1 1 11 12( , ), ( ) exp 1 ( )i i i Ti s y if t Y t t w w e A Y t          , 
      2 2 22 21( , ), ( ) exp 1 ( )i i i T Ti s x if t X t t w w e B X t              . 
with 1i , 2i  0,1  ( 1i  1, 2, 1..., I ; 2i  1,2, 2..., I ) denoting the discounted factors, 1iw , 2iw  
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 0,1  ( 1i  1, 2, 1..., I ; 2i  1,2, 2..., I ) the parameters that measure the contributions of  the 
matrix payoffs of  the game to the fitness of  the corresponding strategies, and 2( , )s y , 1( , )s x  
representing the expectation operators w. r. t. the complete probability law 2 , 1  with depending 
on initial conditions ( , )s y      20,1 I  and ( , )s x      10,1 I , respectively. Thus, the 
problem, after technically modifying the above generalized expected discounted fitness functions, 
facing us can be expressed as follows, 
PROBLEM 1 (Stochastic Differential Cooperative Game on Time): We need to demonstrate that there 
exist two vectors of   stopping times ( )    1 11 ( ),..., ( ),..., ( ) Ti I       and ( )    
 2 21 ( ),..., ( ),..., ( ) Ti I         with    such that, 
  1 11 ( ), ( )i iif Y      
     1 1 1 1 11
1
( , )
( )
sup exp ( ) 1 ( )
i
i i i i iT
s y iw w e A Y 
     

          , 
     1 1 1 1 11( , ) exp ( ) 1 ( )i i i i iTs y iw w e A Y                . 
And simultaneously, 
  2 22 ( ), ( )i iif X        
     2 2 2 2 22
2
( , )
( )
sup exp ( ) 1 ( )
i
i i i i iT T
s x iw w e B X 
     

        
       , 
     2 2 2 2 22( , ) exp ( ) 1 ( )i i i i iT Ts x iw w e B X                     . 
with 1 1( ) ( )i k      (  1 1i k , 1i , 1k  11,2,..., I )  a.s., 2 2( ) ( )i k       (  2 2i k , 2i , 
2k  21,2,..., I )  a.s., ( , )s y  and ( , )s x standing for the expectation operators depending on 
initial conditions or information ( , )s y  and ( , )s x , respectively. 
REMARK 2.1: By applying Girsanov Theorem under comparatively weak conditions, the game 
between different strategies will become a fair-game after the martingale-payoffs being incorporated 
into the game. In this sense, we argue that the corresponding endogenous matching is fair. Moreover, 
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it is easily seen that the endogenous matching fulfills Pareto efficiency as well as individual rationality 
(from the viewpoint of  strategies). 
DEFINITION 1 (Pareto Optimal Endogenous Matching and Induced Nash Equilibrium): The solution, if  
it exists, to Problem 1 defines a game equilibrium, denoted 
  1 11( , ) ( , ),..., ( , ),..., ( , ) ,Ti Ix y x y x y x y           
 1( , ) ( , ),y x y x       2 2..., ( , ),..., ( , ) Ti Iy x y x     . 
with 1 1
1
( , ) 1I i
i
x y     and 2 2
2
( , ) 1I i
i
y x     , induced by stochastic group evolution and 
rational individual choice corresponding to very general normal form game situations. Suppose that 
we are provided with a Pareto optimal Nash equilibrium denoted by  1 11ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ( ,..., ,..., ) ,i I Tx x x x  
2 21ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ( ,..., ,..., )i I Ty y y y  with 1 1
1
ˆ 1I i
i
x   and 2 2
2
ˆ 1I i
i
y   in the original normal form game, 
then we arrive at the Pareto optimal endogenous matching by solving the following equations, i.e., 
ˆ( , )x y x    and ˆ( , )y x y   , and we represent the corresponding Pareto optimal endogenous 
matching by ( , )   . Moreover, we call the Pareto optimal Nash equilibrium ˆ ˆ( , )x y  induced Nash 
equilibrium (in some sense) in the current game situations. 
REMARK 2.2: Specifically, it is worth noting that there exists intrinsic relationship between the 
endogenous matching and the broadly applied random matching (see, Ellison, 1994; Weibull, 1995; 
Aliprantis et al., 2007; Duffie and Sun, 2007; Takahashi, 2010, and among others). Notice that the 
present endogenous matching could be naturally (to some extent and in some sense) viewed as 
certain perturbation of  the perfect world with well-mixed population, random matching indeed 
represents a special case of  the endogenous matching studied in the paper. In other words, if  we 
suppose that individuals or players play the game in a perfect world rather than a structured society, 
random-matching hypothesis is quite appropriate and also random matching itself  would be regarded 
as endogenously determined, i.e., determined by the corresponding game environment. Generally 
speaking, and to the best of  our knowledge, random matching is just employed as an exogenous 
matching mechanism which does not imply any welfare standard (or implied by any welfare standard) 
in existing studies (e.g., Ellison, 1994; Weibull, 1995; Hofbauer and Sigmund, 2003; Benaïm and 
Weibull, 2003; and Takahashi, 2010, and among others). Nevertheless, as an extreme case of  the 
endogenous matching studied here, random matching itself  indeed yields economic-welfare 
intuitions and implications. For example, if  we can establish that 0lim ˆ( , )x y x    and 
0 ˆlim ( , )y x y     , we can definitely call the corresponding random matching asymptotically Pareto 
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efficient (or Pareto optimal). As is well known, people live in a structured society and thus random 
matching only works as certain limit of  the endogenous matching. And random matching will be 
supplied with much richer economic intuitions and implications as long as it is studied in a way 
intimately related to the present endogenous matching. All in all, game rule is implied by the society 
structure7 in some sense and meanwhile the society structure rather implies certain economic- 
welfare implication, so our study of  endogenous matching indeed deepens existing studies of  
matching theory. 
2.3. Existence of  Pareto Optimal Endogenous Matching 
To do this, we now define  ( ) , ( )Z t s t X t   for  t    with (0)Z  ( , )s x      10,1 I , 
and  ( ) , ( )Z t s t Y t  for  t    with (0)Z  ( , )s y      20,1 I . And also we let, 
( , )f s x   1 1 1( , ),..., ( , ),..., ( , )i I Tf f fx x xs x s x s x       ,  
 1 1 11 11( ) ,l l lx x z  ...    1 1 1 11 1 1 1 1 1, ,..., Ti i I Ii l l I l lx z x z  ,  
( , )f s y   1 2 2( , ),..., ( , ),..., ( , )i I Tf f fy y ys y s y s y     , 
And, 
2l
 ( )y       2 2 2 22 2 2 2 2 2 2 21 11 ,..., ,..., Ti i I Il l i l l I l ly z y z y z     . 
Then the characteristic operators of  ( )Z t  and ( )Z t  can be respectively given by (and ,   is 
used to denote the scalar product), 
     1 11 1 1 11 1 1
1 1
22
2
1 1
1( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( , )
2 ( )
I I Ti i i iT
i i i
i i
f f ff s x s x x e Ay s x x s x
s x x
 
 
       
    
    1 1 1 11 1 1 1
0
1 11 1
, ( ) ( , ) ( , ), ( )
I n
k k
l l l l
k l
f s x x f s x f s x x dz  
 
         , 
 f   1 12 IC  . 
And, 
                                                        
7 It should include both spatial structure and division structure of  any given mature market. 
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     2 22 2 2 22 2 2
2 2
22
2
1 1
1( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( , )
2 ( )
I I Ti i i iT T
i i i
i i
f f ff s y s y y e B x s y y s y
s y y
 
 
           
    2 2 2 22 2 2 2
0
2 21 1
, ( ) ( , ) ( , ), ( )
I n
k k
l l l l
k l
f s y y f s y f s y y dz  
 
        , 
 f   2 12 IC  . 
Furthermore, we let 1 1
1
1
11
I i
i
x   , then 1 11Ix    with 10 1   by noting that 1 11 1I ii x 1 . 
Let 1 1
1
2
21
I i
i
x   , then we can get 1 1 1 2Ix      with 2 10 1    . Inductively, we let 
1 1 1
11
( 2)
21
I I i
Ii
x     , then we have 1 1( 3)3 I Ix x    1 13 2I I    with 0  1 2I   1 3I   ...  1 1  ; 
let 1 1 1
11
( 1)
11
I I i
Ii
x     , i.e., 1x 1 1I  , then we get 2x  1 1( 2)I Ix    1 2I  1 1I   with 0  1 1I    
1 2I
   1 3I   ...  1 1  . And without loss of  any generality, we put 0 1  . Then we obtain, 
     12 2 2 2 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 2
1
1
2 1 2 2 2 1
3
, ( )
I
T T T T
i i i i I i i I i I i i
i
u i x e B x b b x b b e B        

          . 
Similarly, notice that 2 2
2 1
I i
i
y 1  and let 2 22 1 11I ii y    , then we have 2Iy  11    with 0   
1 1 . Let 2 2
2
2
21
I i
i
y    , then we see that 2 1 1 2Iy       with 0  2 1 1    . Inductively, let 
2 2 2
22
( 2)
21
I I i
Ii
y      , then we have 2 2( 3)3 I Iy y    2 3I  2 2I    with 0  2 2I   2 3I   ...   
1 1  ; let 2 2 2 22
( 1)
11
I I i
Ii
y      , i.e., 1y 2 1I   , then it follows that 2y  2 2( 2)I Iy    2 2I  2 1I    
with 0 
2 1I
   2 2I   2 3I   ...  1 1 . And we, without loss of  any generality, put 0 1  . Then 
we get, 
     21 1 1 1 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 1
2
1
1 1 2 2 2 1
3
, ( )
I
T T
i i i i I i i I i I i i
i
u i y e A y a a y a a e A        

             . 
Therefore, the discounted fitness functions in Problem 1 can be rewritten as, 
   11 1, exp iif s y s   
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            21 1 1 1 1 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 1
2
1
1 2 2 2 1
3
1
I
i i T
i i i I i i I i I i i
i
w w a a y a a e A      

                   , 
                                                          1i  1, 2, 1..., I . 
   22 1, exp iif s x s    
            12 2 2 2 2 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 2
1
1
1 2 2 2 1
3
1
I
i i T T
i i i I i i I i I i i
i
w w b b x b b e B      

                  , 
                                                           2i  1, 2, 2..., I . (1) 
with 0 
2 1I
   2 2I   2 3I   ...  1 0 1   and 0  1 1I   1 2I   1 3I   ...  1  0 1 . And 
inspection of  the fitness functions given in (1) reveals that one can just define  1( ) , ( )Z t s t X t   
for  t    with (0)Z   1,s x     0,1 , and  1( ) , ( )Z t s t Y t  for  t    with 
(0)Z   1,s y     0,1 . And hence the corresponding characteristic operators of  ( )Z t  and 
( )Z t  are respectively given by, 
       1 1 1 11 1, , ,Tf ff s x s x x e Ay s xs x   
       221 1 1 11 21 ,2 ( )T fx s xx   

 
           1 11 1 1 1 1 1
0
1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1
1
, , ,
n
f
l l l l l lx
l
f s x x z f s x x z s x dz     


  , 
 f   2 2C  . 
And, 
       1 1 1 11 1, , ,T Tf ff s y s y y e B x s ys y         
221 1 1 1
1 2
1 ,
2 ( )
T fy s y
y
      
           2 12 2 2 2 2 2
0
2
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1
1
, , ,
n
f
l l l l l ly
l
f s y y z f s y y z s y dz         
 f   2 2C  . 
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Therefore, based upon the above assumptions and specifications, the following theorem is 
derived, 
THEOREM 1: There exists a unique solution to Problem 1 under very weak conditions, and accordingly the 
existence of  the Pareto optimal endogenous matching is confirmed provided that in the original normal-form game we 
are given a Pareto optimal Nash equilibrium  ˆ ˆ,x y , which is given in Definition 1. 
PROOF: See Appendix A. ▌ 
REMARK 2.3: It is especially worth noting that Theorem 1 not only shows the existence of  the 
Pareto optimal endogenous matching and induced Nash equilibrium given by Definition 1 but also 
provides us with the explicit time length needed so that the Pareto optimal endogenous matching and 
also the induced Nash equilibrium can be achieved by decentralized players. Moreover, it is also 
worth emphasizing that our conclusion holds true for any Pareto optimal strategy combination of  very 
general normal-form games although we have only considered Pareto optimal Nash equilibrium in 
Theorem 1. For instance, (cooperation, cooperation) is a Pareto-optimal strategy combination in PD 
games although it is generally not Nash equilibrium at all. Obviously, our endogenous matching rule 
can lead us to cooperation in PD games. 
3. Conclusion 
In this study, the players follow certain adaptive learning processes while the strategies themselves are 
assumed to be rational by applying the classical as if methodology. Based upon this methodology, it is 
argued that optimal stopping theory is very useful in establishing the game equilibrium. The major 
innovations can be summarized as follows. Firstly, we provide a very general framework for studying 
endogenous matching, and those explicit matching mechanisms developed by Haag and Lagunoff  
(2006), and Bisin et al. (2006) can be regarded as special realizations of  the present model. Secondly, 
the well-known random matching (e.g., Gilboa and Matsui, 1992; Ellison, 1994; Weibull, 1995; 
Aliprantis et al., 2007; Duffie and Sun, 2007; Takahashi, 2010; Podczeck and Puzzello, 2012, and 
among others), as an extreme case of  the endogenous matching under consideration, yields 
economic-welfare intuitions and implications, and the present study provides conditions under which 
the random matching is asymptotically Pareto efficient. Thirdly, our study shows a reasonable approach to 
combine optimal stopping theory and evolutionary game theory, thereby throwing new insights into 
the classical evolutionary game theory (see, Weibull, 1995; Hofbauer and Sigmund, 2003; Benaïm and 
Weibull, 2003, and among others). Last but not least, noting that certain matching mechanism 
implies certain macro-social structure, the present study thus reveals a general existence of  the 
Pareto-optimal social structure in any given normal-form game situations. In particular, one can 
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interpret this result from the following viewpoint, i.e., if  the purpose of  institutional segmentation 
(or segregation) (e.g., Schelling, 1969, 1971; Bowles and Gintis, 1998) is to improve people’s welfare 
in the same community, then we confirm that there exists an optimal level of  segmentation so that the 
welfare of  the entire community is maximized. 
The current paper can be naturally extended in the following ways: first, asymmetric 
information can be introduced into the present model to capture much more economic implications, 
for instance, one can explore the value of  information with respect to the endogenous matching; 
second, the classical stochastic differential cooperative game can be explored based upon the present 
framework; third, specific mechanism, say, reputation mechanism (for example, see, Anderson and 
Smith, 2010) or searching mechanism (e.g., Eeckhout and Kircher, 2010, and references therein), can 
be incorporated into the model to support any other pattern of  endogenous matching; forth, our 
approach can be easily extended to include multiple priors (see, Riedel, 2009, for instance) and also 
to explore the evolutionary equilibria on graphs (see, Ohtsuki et al., 2007, and among others). 
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Appendix 
A. Proof  of  Theorem 1 
 
We proceed the proof  as follows. In Step 1, we derive the optimal stopping rules (and also the 
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corresponding supporting conditions) for strategies 1i , 1 11, 2,...,i I ; in Step 2, we similarly 
establish the optimal stopping rules for strategies 2i , 2 21, 2,...,i I ; and in Step 3, we show (by 
solving a group of  equations) that strategies 1i , 1 11, 2,...,i I , can cooperate to the same optimal 
stopping rule given the optimal stopping rule of  strategies 2i , 2 21, 2,...,i I , and vice versa. About 
the optimal stopping theory used here, one can refer to Øksendal and Sulem (2005) for much more 
details. 
 
STEP 1: For strategy 1i ,  1 11, 2,...,i I . Notice that, 
   1 11 1, expi iif s y s     
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     1 1 1 11 1 1 2exp 0i iT T i iy e B x s w a a     
   1 1 1 1 11 1 2i iT T i ie B x w a a y    
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Then, 
 
1
1, 0if s y   
   
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 . 
Hence, we have, 
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And it is natural to guess that the continuation region 1iD  has the following form, 
    1 1 11 1 1 1, ;0i i iD y s y y y    . 
where, 
   
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Notice that the generator of  ( )Z t  is given by, 
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for  
1
1,i s y   2 2C  . If  we try a function 1i  of  the following form, 
      111 1 1, exp iii s y s y     for some constant 1i  . 
We then get, 
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where, 
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Note that, 
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Therefore, if  we assume that, 
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Then we find that there exists 1 1i   such that, 
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with this value of  1i  we put, 
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for some constant 1 0iC  , to be determined. We, without loss of  any generality, guess that the value 
function is 1C  at 
1
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iy y
  and this leads us to the following “high contact” conditions, 
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Combining the above equations shows that, 
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And this gives, 
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Hence, by (A.4), (A.5) and (A.6), we can define, 
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And then we are in the position to prove that, 
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in which  
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which holds by (A.2). Secondly, to prove, 
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noting that       11 1 1 1 21 11 ii i i iy C y       , and hence  1 1 0i y    holds for 11 10 iy y     
given 1 1i   in (A.4), that is,  1 1 0i y   follows for  0  1y
1
1
iy
 . And this completes the 
short proof. 
 
Case 1.2: 
   
   
2
1 1 1 1
1 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 1
2
1
1 1
2 2 1
3
1 1 2
1 0
sgn sgn
I
i i i i T
i I i i I i I i i
i
iT T
i i
w w a a e A
e B x a a
     

   

              
   

 
It is easy to see that the proof  is quite similar to that of  case 1.1, so we take it omitted. 
 
STEP 2: For strategy 2i ,  2 21, 2,...,i I . Notice that, 
   2 22 1, expi iif s x s       
   12 2 2 2 2 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 2
1
1
1 2 2 2 1
3
1
I
i i T T
i i i I i i I i I i i
i
w w b b x b b e B      

                   
     2 2 2 21 1 1 2exp 0i iT i ix e Ay s w b b      
   2 2 2 2 11 1 2i iT i ie Ay w b b x     
   12 2 2 2 2 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 2
1
2 2 1
3
1
I
i i i i T T
i I i i I i I i i
i
w w b b e B        

            . 
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Case 2.1: 
   
   
1
2 2 2 2
2 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 2
1
2
2 2
2 2 1
3
1 2 1
1 0
sgn sgn
I
i i i i T T
i I i i I i I i i
i
iT
i i
w w b b e B
e Ay b b
     

   

              
   

 
Hence, 
 
2
1, 0if s x   
   
   
12 2 2 2
2 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 21
2 2
2 2
2 2 131
1 1 2
1 Ii i i i T Ti I i i I i I i ii
i iT
i i
w w b b e B
x
e Ay w b b
     

   
         
   
  . 
Then, we have, 
        
12 2 2 2
2 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 212
2 2
2 2
2 2 131 1
1 1 2
1
, ;
Ii i i i T T
i I i i I i I i iii
i iT
i i
w w b b e B
U s x x
e Ay w b b
     

   
             
   
  .  (A.7) 
So it is natural to guess that the continuation region 2iD  has the following form, 
    2 2 21 1 1 1, ;0i i iD x s x x x    . 
where, 
   
   
12 2 2 2
2 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 21
2 2 2
2 2
2 2 131
1 1 2
1 Ii i i i T Ti I i i I i I i ii
i i iT
i i
w w b b e B
x
e Ay w b b
     

   
        
   
  .              (A.8) 
Notice that the generator of  ( )Z t  is given by, 
       2 2 2
2
2
21 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 2
1,
2 ( )
Ti i iT
i s x x e Ay xs x x
          
    
           1 212 1 1 2 1 1 1 1
0
1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1
1
, , ,i
n
i l l i l l l lx
l
s x x z s x x z s x dz       


   
for  
2
1,i s x   2 2C  . If  we try to choose      222 1 1, exp iii s x s x       for some constant 
2i   . Then we get,  
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         2 22 2 22 11 1 1 11, exp i ii i iTi s x s x e Ay x x        
      
       22 22 21 1 1 11 12
iT i ix x
         
         21 2 221 1 1 1 1 1
0
1
11 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1
1
i i in
i
l l l l l l
l
x x z x z x x dz
     

          
  

   
    22 221exp ii iis x h      . 
where, 
       2 2 2 2 22 1 11 1 12 Ti i i i iTih e Ay                
     21 21 1 1 1 1 1
0
1
1 1 1 1
1 1
1
1 1
in
i
l l l l l l
l
z z dz
   

        


 . 
Noting that, 
2
2 1
(1) iTih e Ay     and  222limi iih      . 
Consequently, if  we suppose that, 
2
1
iTe Ay   ,                                                             (A.9) 
Thus, it is easily seen that there exists 2 1i   such that, 
 22 0iih    .                                                           (A.10) 
with this value of  2i  we put, 
       
2
2
2
2
12 2
2 2
2 2 2 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 2 2
1
1 1 1
1
1 1 1
1 2 2 2 1
3
,0
,
1 , 1
ii
i
is
i
Ii
i is T T
i i i I i i I i I i i i
i
e C x x x
s x
e w w b b x b b e B x x



   
 
 
   

                      





  
 
in which 2 0iC   is some constant that remains to be determined. If  we require that 
2i
  is 
continuous at 
2
1 1
ix x
  we get the following equation, 
     122 2 22 2 2 2 2 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 2
1
1 1
1 2 2 2 1
3
1
i I
i i i T T
i i i i i I i i I i I i i
i
C x w w b b x b b e B
         

          
    ,   (A.11) 
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If  we require that 
2i
  is differentiable at 
2
1 1
ix x
  we get the additional equation, 
   22 2 22 2 211 1 2ii i ii i iC x w b b      .                                            (A.12) 
So, combining equation (A.11) and equation (A.12) yields, 
 
 
   
 
2
12 22
2 2 2 2 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 22 1
2 2
2 2
2 2
2
11
1 2 2 2 13
11 1 2
1
i
i
Ii i T Ti
i i i i I i i I i I i ii i
ii i i ii
w w b b x b b e BC x
w b bC x


   

    

         


   
 
 
  
   
12 2 2
2 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 21
2 2 2
2 2
2 2 131
1 2
1
1
Ii i i T T
i I i i I i I i ii
i i i
i i
w w b b e B
x
w b b
    

   
         
   
  .            (A.13) 
And this produces, 
 
 
2
2 22
2
2
2
1 2
11
i
i
i ii
i
i
w b b
C
x
 
 


.                                                    (A.14) 
Then, by applying equation (A.10), equation (A.13) and equation (A.14), we are in the position to 
prove that       22 22 1 1, exp ii iif s x s C x        is a supermeanvalued majorant of   2 1,if s x . Firstly, 
noting that, 
   2 22 1, expi iif s x s       
   12 2 2 2 2 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 2
1
1
1 2 2 2 1
3
1
I
i i T T
i i i I i i I i I i i
i
w w b b x b b e B      

                   
     2 2 2 21 1 1 2exp 0i iT i ix e Ay s w b b     , 21 1ix x    
   2 2 2 2 11 1 2i iT i ie Ay w b b x     
   12 2 2 2 2 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 2
1
2 2 1
3
1
I
i i i i T T
i I i i I i I i i
i
w w b b e B        

            , 2
1 1
ix x
   
   
   
12 2 2 2
2 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 21
2 2
2 2
2 2 131
1 1 2
1 Ii i i i T Ti I i i I i I i ii
i iT
i i
w w b b e B
x
e Ay w b b
     

   
         
   
  , 2
1 1
ix x
   
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   
   
12 2 2 2
2 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 21
2 2 2
2 2
2 2 131
1 1 2
1 Ii i i i T Ti I i i I i I i ii
i i iT
i i
w w b b e B
x
e Ay w b b
     

   
         
   
   
which holds by (A.8). Secondly, to show that, 
     122 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 2
1
1 1
1 2 2 2 1
3
1
i I
i i i T T
i i i I i i I i I i i
i
C x w w b b x b b e B
       

          
    , 
for 
2
1 10 ix x
   . Define 
 2 1i x    22 21 1ii iC x w      
   12 2 2 2 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 2
1
1
1 2 2 2 1
3
I
i T T
i i i I i i I i I i i
i
w b b x b b e B      

          . 
Then with our chosen values of  2iC  and 2i , we see that    2 22 21 1 0i ii ix x     . Furthermore, 
noting that      22 2 2 2 21 11 ii i i ix C x           , and hence  2 1 0i x    holds for 21 10 ix x     
given 2 1i   in (A.10), that is,  2 1 0i x   follows for 
2
1 10 ix x
   . And hence the desired 
result is established. 
 
Case 2.2: 
   
   
1
2 2 2 2
2 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 2
1
2
2 2
2 2 1
3
1 1 2
1 0
sgn sgn
I
i i i i T T
i I i i I i I i i
i
iT
i i
w w b b e B
e Ay b b
     

   

              
   

 
We take the proof  of  case 2.2, which is quite similar to that of  case 2.1, omitted. 
 
STEP 3: The existence of  the Pareto optimal endogenous matching. 
It follows from the requirements of  Problem 1 that 1 11 2 ...y y
   
1
1 ...iy
 
1
1
Iy
  with 
1
1
iy
  
defined in (A.5). Let 
1 1
1 1
i ky y
   ( 1 1i k  , 1 1 1, 1,2,...,i k I ), then one can easily see that, 
1 1 2 1 1 2 1 1 2 2 1 1,23 2 ,34 3 , 1, 1
...i k I i k I i k I I i k              . 
where, 
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 
  
 
  
1 1
1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2
1 1 2 2 1 1
1 1 1 1
, 1 , 1
, , 1
1 2 1 21 1
i k
i j i j k j k j
i k j j i k
i i k k
a a a a
a a a a
 
 
 

      . 
   
  
   
  
1 1 1 1 1 1
1 2 1 1 2 1
1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 11 2 1 2
1 1
1 1
k k k i i iT T
k I k i I i
i k k k i i
k k i i
w w a e A w w a e A
a a w a a w
   
 
               
 
 . 
1 1i k  , 1 1 1, 1,2,...,i k I ; 2 22,3,..., 1j I  . 
Accordingly, we have, 
2 2
2 2
1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 2
12,23 12,34 12, 1,
23,23 23,34 23, 1,
1, ,23 1, ,34 1, , 1, ( 1) ( 2)
I I
I I
I I I I I I I I I I


      
             


   

 
2
2
2
2
3
1 ( 2) 1
I
I
I





 
       




 
1 1
1
12
23
1, ( 1) 1I I I  
       
 . 
which implies that, 
    .                                                              (A.15) 
where “ ” denotes Moore-Penrose generalized inverse. 
Similarly, we obtain 1 11 2 ...x x
   
2
1 ...ix
 
2
1
Ix
  with 
2
1
ix
  defined in (A.13) according to 
Problem 1. Now, let 
2 2
1 1
i kx x
   ( 2 2i k  , 2 2 2, 1, 2,...,i k I ), then we get, 
2 2 1 2 2 1 2 2 1 1 2 2,23 2 ,34 3 , 1, 1
...i k I i k I i k I I i k               . 
where, 
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 
    . 
   
  
   
  
2 2 2 2 2 2
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1 1
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k k k i i iT T T T
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w w b e B w w b e B
b b w b b w
   
 
               
           . 
2 2i k  , 2 2 2, 1, 2,...,i k I ; 1 12,3,..., 1j I  . 
Consequently, we obtain, 
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  
   
  
 
1
1
1
2
3
1 ( 2) 1
I
I
I





 
       
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23
1, ( 1) 1I I I  
       
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


. 
which leads us to the following equation, 
     .                                                             (A.16) 
where “ ” stands for the Moore-Penrose generalized inverse. 
Consequently, by equations in (A.16) and (A.15), we get 
2
2 1
2Iy y   , 23 3Iy      
2 2I
  , … , 2Iy   1 1   and 12 12Ix x   , 1 13 3 2I Ix      ,…, 1Ix   1 1  with 1 1 11 2y y y     

1 1
1 1... ...i Iy y
     and 1 1 11 2x x x    2 21 1... ...i Ix x     . So, we obtain the corresponding game 
equilibrium, denoted by 
  1 11( , ) ( , ),..., ( , ),..., ( , ) ,Ti Ix y x y x y x y           
  2 21( , ) ( , ),..., ( , ),..., ( , ) Ti Iy x y x y x y x              
with 1 1
1
( , ) 1I i
i
x y     and 2 2
2
( , ) 1I i
i
y x     , but noting that this game equilibrium may not be 
the Pareto optimal equilibrium of  the original normal form games thanks to the stochastic factors, 
and this is why we need to choose appropriate values of    and   such that the original Pareto 
optimal Nash equilibrium  ˆ ˆ,x y  will be definitely chosen by the players. 
To summarize, we get the following theorem, 
THEOREM 1’: If  we are provided that the following inequalities hold, that is, 11
iT Te B x   in (A.3) and 
2
1
iTe Ay    in (A.9), then Problem 1 is solved as long as we have      in (A.15) and       in 
(A.16). That is to say, the existence of  the Pareto optimal endogenous matching is confirmed just via putting 
ˆ( , )x y x    and ˆ( , )y x y   , in which  ˆ ˆ,x y  is the given Pareto optimal Nash equilibrium in the 
corresponding normal form games. 
Therefore, Theorem 1 is established thanks to Theorem 1’. ▌ 
